Publications
"On the Demand for Natural Gas in Urban China," with Xinye Zheng, Yihua Yu. Energy Policy, 70(2014): 57-63.
"Conservation Spillovers: the Effect of Rooftop Solar on Climate Change Beliefs," with Graham Beattie and Andrea LaNauze. Environmental and Resource Economics 74.3(2019): 1425-1451.
Working Papers
"Correspondence Bias," with Yiming Liu and George Loewenstein.
When drawing inferences about a person’s personal characteristics from their actions, “correspondence bias” is the tendency to overestimate the influence of those characteristics and underestimate the influence of situational factors, such as incentives the individual faces. We build a simple framework to formalize correspondence bias, and test its predictions in an online experiment. Consistent with correspondence bias, subjects are, on average, willing to pay to receive the dictator-game givings of an individual with whom they are randomly assigned to play a game that encourages cooperation rather than one with whom they play a game that encourages selfish behavior. We show, further, that experiencing both games oneself, as opposed to playing one and observing the other, reduces the bias, and receiving information about how each of the players behaved in both games, eliminates it.
"Political Trust, Delegation, and Responsibility-Shifting: Evidence from China's One Child Policy," with Yiming Liu.
We provide causal evidence on how responsibility-shifting through mass mobilization took place in the implementation of the one-child policy in China. We show that trust in local governments was reduced when local governments were the enforcers of the policy (1979-1990), while trust in neighbors (but not governments) was reduced when policy enforcement was delegated to civilians through incentivizing them to report neighbors' violations of the policy (1991-2015). Our identification strategy exploits the exogeneity of the gender of the firstborn child. The study provides the first set of field evidence of how a government can implement unpopular policies without losing trust.
"Administrative Barriers, Market Integration and Economic Growth: Evidence from China," with Mingqin Wu.
Along with the reduction in transportation costs in the last two centuries, institutional trade barriers have become increasingly important obstacles to further market integration. This paper examines the impact of a policy reform in China that removed inter-regional administrative trade barriers by incorporating counties into prefectures with a larger market. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we compare incorporated counties, both before and after the reform, to two novel control groups: counties that applied for incorporation but failed and counties that were incorporated several years later. We find that the reform immediately and persistently increased the economic growth of incorporated counties. Several sources of evidence suggest that treated counties experienced relatively rapid growth because they became more integrated into the domestic market. First, using an indirect measure of protection, we find that the reform significantly reduced local protectionism between incorporated counties and their corresponding prefectures. Second, market shares of more productive sectors increased in treated counties following the reform. Third, firms producing tradable goods rapidly entered treated counties. Finally, less profitable firms in treated counties were more likely to exit.
"On the Demand for Natural Gas in Urban China," with Xinye Zheng, Yihua Yu. Energy Policy, 70(2014): 57-63.
"Conservation Spillovers: the Effect of Rooftop Solar on Climate Change Beliefs," with Graham Beattie and Andrea LaNauze. Environmental and Resource Economics 74.3(2019): 1425-1451.
Working Papers
"Correspondence Bias," with Yiming Liu and George Loewenstein.
When drawing inferences about a person’s personal characteristics from their actions, “correspondence bias” is the tendency to overestimate the influence of those characteristics and underestimate the influence of situational factors, such as incentives the individual faces. We build a simple framework to formalize correspondence bias, and test its predictions in an online experiment. Consistent with correspondence bias, subjects are, on average, willing to pay to receive the dictator-game givings of an individual with whom they are randomly assigned to play a game that encourages cooperation rather than one with whom they play a game that encourages selfish behavior. We show, further, that experiencing both games oneself, as opposed to playing one and observing the other, reduces the bias, and receiving information about how each of the players behaved in both games, eliminates it.
"Political Trust, Delegation, and Responsibility-Shifting: Evidence from China's One Child Policy," with Yiming Liu.
We provide causal evidence on how responsibility-shifting through mass mobilization took place in the implementation of the one-child policy in China. We show that trust in local governments was reduced when local governments were the enforcers of the policy (1979-1990), while trust in neighbors (but not governments) was reduced when policy enforcement was delegated to civilians through incentivizing them to report neighbors' violations of the policy (1991-2015). Our identification strategy exploits the exogeneity of the gender of the firstborn child. The study provides the first set of field evidence of how a government can implement unpopular policies without losing trust.
"Administrative Barriers, Market Integration and Economic Growth: Evidence from China," with Mingqin Wu.
Along with the reduction in transportation costs in the last two centuries, institutional trade barriers have become increasingly important obstacles to further market integration. This paper examines the impact of a policy reform in China that removed inter-regional administrative trade barriers by incorporating counties into prefectures with a larger market. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we compare incorporated counties, both before and after the reform, to two novel control groups: counties that applied for incorporation but failed and counties that were incorporated several years later. We find that the reform immediately and persistently increased the economic growth of incorporated counties. Several sources of evidence suggest that treated counties experienced relatively rapid growth because they became more integrated into the domestic market. First, using an indirect measure of protection, we find that the reform significantly reduced local protectionism between incorporated counties and their corresponding prefectures. Second, market shares of more productive sectors increased in treated counties following the reform. Third, firms producing tradable goods rapidly entered treated counties. Finally, less profitable firms in treated counties were more likely to exit.