

YI HAN

CONTACT INFORMATION:

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EDUCATION

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics, University of Pittsburgh, May 2020.

Thesis: “Essays in Development and Behavioral Economics”

Thesis Committee: Prof. Daniel Berkowitz (Chair), Prof. Thomas Rawski,
Prof. Yogita Shamdasani, Prof. Jason Cook and Prof. George Loewenstein

M.A. in Economics, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China, 2014.

B.A. in Economics, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China, 2012.

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Primary Fields: Development Economics, Behavioral Economics

Secondary Fields: Environmental Economics, Political Economy

PUBLICATIONS

“[Conservation Spillovers: The Effect of Rooftop Solar on Climate Change Beliefs](#)”,
Environmental and Resource Economics (2019): 1-27. (with Graham Beattie and Andrea
LaNauze).

“[On the Demand for Natural Gas in Urban China](#)”, *Energy Policy* 70 (2014): 57-63.
(with Xinye Zheng, Yihua Yu).

WORKING PAPERS

“[Administrative Barriers, Market Integration and Economic Growth: Evidence from China](#)” (*Job Market Paper*).

“[Responsibility-shifting through Delegation: Evidence from China’s One-child Policy](#)” (with Yiming Liu).

“[Correspondence Bias](#)” (with Yiming Liu, George Loewenstein).

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

Teaching Assistant, Introduction to Microeconomics 2015, 2018-2019

Instructor, Introduction to Microeconomics Summer 2018,2019

Overall teaching effectiveness score: 4.30/5 (2018), 4.41/5 (2019)

WORKING PAPER ABSTRACTS

“Administrative Barriers, Market Integration and Economic Growth: Evidence from China” (*Job Market Paper*)

Recent studies show that a substantial reduction in intra-national transportation costs has contributed to domestic market integration and economic growth. However, institutional trade barriers still widely exist at the local level. This paper examines the impact of a policy reform in China that removes inter-regional administrative trade barriers by incorporating counties into prefecture with a larger market. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I compare the incorporated counties, both before and after the reform, to two control groups: counties that applied for incorporation but failed and counties that experienced the incorporation several years later. The results show that the reform immediately and persistently increases the economic growth of the incorporated counties. Several sources of evidence indicate that the treated counties experienced relatively rapid growth because they became more integrated into the domestic market. First, the market shares of productive sectors increased in treated counties following the reform. Secondly, firms producing tradable goods rapidly entered treated counties as a result of the reform. Third, the less profitable firms in treated counties were more likely to exit than in control counties. Finally, using Bai et al. (2004)’s indirect measure of protection, I find that the reform significantly reduced local protectionism between the incorporated counties and their corresponding prefectures.

“Responsibility-shifting through Delegation: Evidence from China’s One-child Policy” (joint with Yiming Liu)

There is a growing body of experimental evidence indicating that delegation can foster the shifting of responsibility for unpopular actions from a principal to an agent. Using the well-known episode of the one-child policy in China (OCP), we provide field evidence for responsibility shifting through delegation. We compare the impact of the OCP on parents who experienced OCP during 1979-1990 (Phase I) when local governments were the primary enforcer versus 1991-2015 (Phase II) when the enforcement of the policy was delegated to the civilians by incentivizing them to report their neighbors’ violations of the policy and appointing cluster leaders to monitor neighbors. Our identification strategy exploits the exogeneity of the gender of first-born child and argues that parents whose first born is a girl are more likely to violate the OCP because of the traditional Chinese “at least one son” preference. Consistent with the predictions of the responsibility-shifting theory, we find that parents who were more exposed to the OCP in Phase II currently trust their neighbors less, and this effect is exacerbated for those parents whose first born was a girl. The OCP exposure does not undermine trust in local governments. However, parents exposed to the OCP in Phase I currently trust their local governments less; and, it is the parents whose first child was a girl who are more strongly impacted. The OCP exposure does not have a significant impact on trust in neighbors in that phase. We explore three alternative interpretations of the results, but none of them can account for these findings.

“Correspondence Bias” (joint with Yiming Liu, George Loewenstein)

When drawing inferences about a person's enduring characteristics from her actions, correspondence bias is the tendency to overestimate the influence of the person's enduring characteristics and underestimate the influence of transient situational factors. Focusing on incentives as one important situational factor, we build a simple model to formalize correspondence bias, and test predictions of the model in an online experiment. All players first play the dictator game, as the dictator, with an unknown receiver. Next, depending on their experimental condition, players are assigned to play a ‘benign’ game that encourages cooperation with another player, a ‘malign’ game that encourages selfish behavior, or both games with different players. Everyone then chooses to receive the dictator givings from one of two players who they may have played the benign or malign game with. Consistent with correspondence bias, subjects are on average willing to pay to receive the dictator givings from a player with whom they played the benign game. We show, further, that experiencing both games oneself, as opposed to playing one and observing the other, reduces the bias, and receiving information about how each of the players behaved in both games, eliminates it.

SEMINAR AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS:

University of Pittsburgh Labor/Development Economics Seminar, 2019
Society for Institutional and Organizational Economics (SIOE) Annual Conference, 2018
CBDR Brownbag, Carnegie Mellon University, 2017
The Ronald Coase Institute Workshop on Institutional Analysis, 2016
University of Pittsburgh Labor/Development Brownbag, 2019, 2018, 2017
University of Pittsburgh Urban/Public Brownbag, 2018, 2016

HONORS, FELLOWSHIPS AND GRANTS:

Three-minute Thesis 1st Prize Winner for the Social Sciences Division, 2018
Ronald Coase Institute Fellowship, Summer 2017
Andrew Mellon Predoctoral Fellowship, 2017-2018
Arts and Sciences Graduate Summer Research Fellowship, 2016
Arts and Sciences Graduate Fellowship, 2014-2015
National Scholarship of Renmin University of China, 2014
Peking University-Lincoln Institute Dissertation Scholarship, 2013-2014
Excellent Graduate of Renmin University of China, 2012
First-class Scholarship of Renmin University of China, 2008, 2009

SKILLS:

Stata, ArcGIS, Matlab, LaTeX